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Lone-wolf terrorism is often more difficult to detect through intelligence due to limited communication between
plotters. This study addresses this problem by spelling out an alternative method for impeding such attacks. It
combines crime scripts, situational crime prevention and rational planning to study how to impede attacks such as
the 2011 Norway attacks. Analyzing the transport issues in these attacks demonstrates that some sort of entry
control and measures facilitating the evacuation in case of prolonged attacks might reduce the harm.
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“Not even the DDR during the years of the Stasi, which
we do not want to compare us with, could have stopped
him”a Janne Kristiansen told the Norwegian newspaper,
Dagbladet, after the 2011 Norway attacks. The offender,
Anders Behring Breivik (ABB), had lived an apparently
law-abiding life, and avoided voicing violent opinions to
others (Klungtveit 2011, p. 16). And even if ABB left
some tracks that could (and perhaps should) have
warned the intelligence services of his plans (NOU
2012), his lone-wolf status made him more difficult to
detect by intelligence alone. A lone-wolf terrorist oper-
ates individually, does not belong to an organized group
or network and conceives and directs the modus oper-
andi without any direct outside command or hierarchy
(Spaaji 2012, p. 16). ABB was explicit about the political
motivation behind his attacks, but even if we attempt to
look for evidence of some kind of extremist ideas, not all
lone-wolf attackers exhibit signs of any political purpose
(Borum 2013), as such lone attacks may not fit the ter-
rorism label.
This study aims to determine what sort of measures
could obstruct lone-wolf attacks, either by stopping an
attack entirely or simply reducing the harm inflicted.
The author attempts to answer this problem by investi-
gating the 2011 Norway attacks, because they demonstrate
how much harm a resourceful and highly committedCorrespondence: sfm@toi.no
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in any medium, provided the original work is pattacker can inflict alone. The individual attacks carried
out by ABB are similar in that they were committed by
the same offender on the same day, but differ in that
the offender employed two different conventional
weapons: improvised explosives and small arms. The
paper primarily focuses on transport issues due to
space limitations.
Most, if not all, of the measures discussed in this paper
will of course also apply to other malicious plots that
failed to be detected.
Lone-wolf terrorism is a marginal phenomenon com-
pared to mainstream terrorism; Spaaji (2012), p. 27 dem-
onstrates that among the terrorist incidents in his study,
only 1.8% can be attributed to lone wolves. Among these
lone-wolf incidents, 17% are motivated by right-wing ex-
tremism/white supremacy (Spaaji 2012, p. 37). Nesser
(2012) has further shown that despite al-Qaida’s efforts
to ignite leaderless jihad in the West, very few jihadist
terrorists in Europe have been true loners. None of the
attackers in the 10 individual operations in Nesser’s
chronology of jihadist terrorist plots in Western Europe
qualifies as a “lone wolf” in a strict sense since all the
attackers seem to have some sort of link to organized
radical environments (Nesser 2012). Despite lone-wolf
terrorism’s rarity, the 2011 Norway attacks have demon-
strated how effective a lone-wolf attack can be, and
Breivik’s compendium (Berwick 2011) can be employed
as an operational manual for future lone wolfs.
Despite the difficulties some scholars have attempted
to establish what distinguishes lone wolves from othern access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
Meyer Crime Science 2013, 2:7 Page 2 of 13
http://www.crimesciencejournal.com/content/2/1/7extremist offenders. Comparing far-right loners with
other far-right homicide offenders, Gruenewald et al.
(2013) have found that far-right loners are more likely to
have a military background, less likely to be married and
more likely to live completely alone. Phillips (2011),
Phillips and Pohl (2012) and Phillips (2009) have all
employed economic frameworks to establish how lone
attackers would act if maximizing their utility. Lone wolves
are expected to predominantly choose assassinationb,
armed attack, bombing, hostage taking or unconven-
tional attacks, rather than arson, hijacking or kidnapping
(Phillips 2011). Phillips and Pohl (2012) used “economic
profiling” to distinguish between risk-seeking and risk-
averse lone wolves, while Phillips (2009) employed
modern portfolio theory to show that that risk-averse
terrorist groups should tend to exhibit a bias towards
bombing and armed attack.
Since early detection is more difficult, a focus on the
more immediate surroundings of the offence could
prove to be more fruitful in advising authorities on how
to respond to these attacks. Scholars have successfully
employed environmental criminology, i.e. Situational
Crime Prevention (SCP) theory, to suggest measures
against “new crimes” such as identity theft, cyber crime,
organized crime and illegal immigration (Freilich and
Newman 2009), as well as terrorism. Moreover, Clarke
and Newman (2006) have employed situational crime
prevention to help identify the four basic pillars of ter-
rorist action: distinguishing between targets, weapons,
tools and the facilitating conditions. Meyer (2011) com-
bined rational choice theory, SCP and crime scripts, and
demonstrated that when protecting railways against ex-
plosive attacks, the authorities should prioritize mea-
sures that help reduce the impact of an explosive attack,
rather than the probability that such an attack will suc-
ceed. Yun (2009) employed SCP and script theory in a
case study of hostage taking in Afghanistan, concluding
that: (1) the authorities need to deny the hostage takers
gains through negotiation, and (2) the launching of
military or law enforcement operations to disrupt the
hostage situation might deter future hostage takers
(Yun 2009). Freilich and Chermak (2009) apply SCP to
two case studies of fatal far-right attacks against law en-
forcement in the United States, and suggest the use of
“soft” measures that reduce provocations, such as avoid-
ing threatening police behaviour. Belli and Freilich
(2009) also propose employing a “soft” approach for pre-
venting ideologically motivated tax refusals, including
SCP measures such as reducing frustration and stress by
simplifying the filing procedure.
All the scholars above have shown how environmental
criminology can be employed to establish which mea-
sures should be employed against a wide range of
crimes, including terror attacks. And when traditionalintelligence fails in stopping lone wolves’ pre-events, en-
vironmental criminology can still be used to deal with
such attacks. This study aims to demonstrate this by
outlining a method, combining crime scripts, situational
crime prevention and rational planning for finding mea-
sures that may impede lone-wolf attacks and employing
this method on the 2011 Norway attacks. More specific-
ally, the study describes what sort of measures might
have impeded the transport in the 2011 Norway attacks,
and discusses whether these measures would also have
impeded other comparable attacks.
Section 2 outlines methods and theories employed in
this study. Section 3 first investigates what sort of mea-
sures might have stopped and/or reduced the harm from
ABB’s attack with a vehicle-borne explosive, and exam-
ines whether these measures also would have stopped
and/or reduced the harm from comparable attacks. This
exercise is repeated for ABB’s shooting massacre at
Utøya, and Section 4 draws conclusions.Methods
This paper investigates the 2011 Norway attacks. It also
discusses comparable solo attacks that have inflicted a
lot of harm: to ensure diversity, cases where the political
motivation were jihadists (one bombing and one shoot-
ing) and cases in which the motivation was right-wing
(one bombing and one shooting) have been included:
The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (Hartzler 1997), the
2005 Doha Players Theatre bombing (Lepeska 2010; BBC
News 2005b), the 1994 Tombs of the Patriarchs massacre
(Church et al. 1994) and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting
(NYTimes.com 2011). Lastly, a case similar to the Norway
strike, but one that was foiled by the police is also dis-
cussed. This was the case of Brunon Kwiecien, a chemistry
professor, who allegedly planned to attack the Polish par-
liament and was arrested in 2012 (West 2012).
The dependent variable in this study is the harm im-
posed, and attacks in which the offender succeeded in
imposing a lot of harm have been deliberately chosen.
This choice could bias the results and reduce the extent
to which they can be generalised to less harmful attacks.
However, measures that aim to impede more harmful at-
tacks will, ceteris paribus, also be more effective than
measures that aim at impeding less harmful attacks. The
bias towards harmful solo attacks in this study is there-
fore beneficial rather than detrimental.The procedure
The procedure consists of six steps: (1) identifying a
crime script, (2) sketching a detailed narrative, (3) identi-
fying script clashes, (4) identifying situational crime pre-
vention measures, (5) indicating rational planning, and
(6) discussing comparable attacks.
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is a description of the procedural sequence a criminal
goes through when committing a specific type of crime.
By spelling out the actions (and their goals) necessary to
complete the crime, the crime script can “enhance situ-
ational crime prevention policies by drawing attention to
a fuller range of possible intervention points” (Cornish
1994, pp. 159–160). The crime scripts in this paper are
based upon both how ABB committed his attacks (open
sources) and the author’s impression of possible alterna-
tive actions in case he had faced other conditions or had
chosen to act differently.
Second, what George and Bennett call a detailed
narrative is sketched (2). The detailed narrative, or story,
is presented in the form of a chronicle that purports to
show how the attacks came about (George and Bennett
2005, p. 210).
Third, “script clashes”, in which the offender’s script
engages with the user or preventer’s script, are identified
(3), including issues such as surveillance versus conceal-
ment, challenge versus excuse and pursuit versus escape
(Ekblom 2011, p. 151).
Fourth, the information collected through the first
three steps is employed to identify situational crime pre-
vention measures that could have impeded the attack
(4). Situational crime prevention focuses “on specific
crime types, seeking to change the immediate environ-
ment such that potential offenders either are physically
prevented from committing the crime or perceive the
opportunities as limited and the risk as high, and thus
might choose against committing the crime” (Clarke
1983, p. 225).
Fifth, how the offender might have reacted if faced
with these measures is discussed (5). Would he have
abandoned the attack entirely, gone through with the at-
tack as planned (with a heightened risk of being pre-
vented or less harm inflicted) or changed the attack
significantly? Here, the rational choice approach is
employed to speculate upon his optimal adaptations
given different constraints. This perspective is referred
to as rational planning, a natural extension of situational
crime prevention theory.
Sixth, a discussion on whether the above measures
would also have impeded comparable attacks, and two
bombing and two shootings are included (6). As when
choosing the primary attacks, solo attacks that inflicted
a lot of harm have been selected. To ensure diversity,
cases in which the political motivation was jihadists (one
bombing and one shooting) and cases in which the mo-
tivation was right-wing (one bombing and one shooting)
have been included.
On 19 April 1995, Timothy McVeigh planted a vehicle
bomb in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring
hundreds (Hartzler 1997). He is often given as a classicexample of the “lone wolf”, despite evidently having
received extensive help prior to the day of the bombing, es-
pecially from Terry Nichols (Fattah 2007). The Oklahoma
bombing has been included because it is the deadliest
right-wing bomb attack since World War II.
On 19 March 2005, an Egyptian named Omar Ahmad
Abdullah Ali detonated a car bomb at the Doha Players
Theatre in Qatar, killing a British director and injuring
12 others; police believe he acted alone (Lepeska 2010;
BBC news 2005b). The Doha Players Theatre bombing
has been chosen because it is the deadliest jihadist lone-
wolf bombing attack since World War II.
On 25 February 1994, an Israeli settler opened fire on
unarmed Muslims while they were praying at the Tombs
of the Patriarchs (Church et al. 1994), killing 29 and in-
juring 125 worshipers in the shooting (Issacharoff and
Levinson 2010). The Cave of the Patriarchs massacre has
been included because it is the deadliest shooting mas-
sacre committed by a right-wing lone wolf, with the ex-
ception of the shooting massacre by ABB.
On 5 November 2009, an U.S. Army Major started
shooting in Fort Hood, killing 13 people and hurting
nearly 30 others (NYTimes.com 2011). This shooting
massacre has been chosen because it is the deadliest
shooting massacre committed by a jihadist lone wolf.
Lastly, a case designed to be similar to the Norway
strike, but one that was foiled by the police, has been in-
cluded. This case has been chosen because the attacker
was both a self-proclaimed supporter of Breivik and the
plot tactically resembled Breivik’s in many ways.
On 9 November 2012, Poland’s Internal Security
Agency arrested Brunon Kwiecien, a chemistry professor
who allegedly planned to attack the Polish parliament.
Kwiecien intended to construct an explosive device
using four metric tonnes of ANFO inside a tanker truck,
crashing through the gates of the parliament building
and detonating the device within the courtyard. Had he
executed his attack successfully, he likely would have
caused more damage and more deaths than Breivik’s ex-
plosive device (West 2012).
Sources
This study refers to the indictment, the 22 July Commis-
sion’s final report, media sources and ABB’s compen-
dium. The indictment, in both Norwegian (18 pages)
and English (19 pages), was electronically distributed as
pdf documents to the media and includes a list of 102
persons who ABB either killed or inflicted serious phys-
ical injuries upon. For each person, the indictment
includes a description of how he or she was killed/ser-
iously injured.
The Norwegian government appointed an independent
commission on 12 August 2011 to review and learn
from the terrorist attacks on the Government Complex
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mission’s 10 members were professionals with experi-
ence from relevant fields, and they appointed their own
secretariat. The Commission submitted its report to
Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg on Monday,
13 August 2012, and after publication, the report was
made publicly available as a pdf documents on the Com-
mission’s websitec in Norwegian (482 pages), as well as
an extract in English (27 pages). The media coverage
was used as a supplement to the Commission’s report
and the indictment, and was mostly obtained by con-
ducting key word searches on the web using Google.
The articles were all read through by the author.
The combination of the indictment, the 22 July Com-
mission’s final report and the media coverage make it
possible to form a rather accurate picture of the inci-
dents, whereas the correctness of ABB’s compendium is
more uncertain. ABB wrote the compendium both to
convince the readers about his ideas and to advise like-
minded individuals in how to help his causes. However,
ABB probably also wanted to make himself look good
and make his actions look more rational and purposive
than they actually were. For example, ABB lied about
the existence of the organization known as the Knights
Templar and the purpose of his trip to Liberia. This as-
pect should therefore be considered when employing the
compendium as a source.
Results
As stated in his compendium, it is assumed that ABB’s
purpose in attacking was to strike targets with a high
number of (multicultural) traitors that were also rather
easy to hit. ABB explicitly identifies Marxist/multicul-
tural parties (including headquarters and annual meet-
ings) as attractive targets (Berwick 2011, pp. 1449-1450).
Moreover, he also discusses how to choose which traitor
to assassinate: “The third mistake is to select an
overwhelmingly protected individual as a target for as-
sassination. Twelve failed attempts on an extremely
well-protected individual could have alternatively been
12 successful attacks on lesser targets executing more
than 50 primary targets. Targets should be influential
media personalities – multicultural politicians, journal-
ists/editors, cultural Marxist professors, Marxist writers/
artists, NGO leaders and global investors. Obviously,
focus on individuals who do not have armed body
guards” (Berwick 2011, p. 1305). He explains this further
by saying: “Approximately 10-20 of our most attractive
targets in a given country are likely to be under armed
police guard, so choose five targets that are not likely to
be selected for armed protection. The actual five targets
may be any category of A or B traitors, hardened influ-
ential Marxists or multiculturalist career cynisists or sui-
cidal humanists” (Berwick 2011, p. 1424).The explosive attack
This section’s purpose is to investigate what sort of mea-
sures might have impeded the transport of explosives in
the 2011 Norway explosive attack. The first part presents
the crime script ABB had to follow to complete a suc-
cessful explosive attack. The second part outlines how
ABB transported the explosives from the safe house at
Rena to the bomb site, and points out some possible script
clashes between ABB and other relevant actors. Third, a
discussion of which measures that could have either
stopped the attack or reduced the harm inflicted, and how
ABB might have adapted to these measures, is included.
Lastly, this section discusses whether these measures also
would have impeded other comparable attacks.
Crime script (1)
A crime script for an offender when leaving a vehicle-
borne device could go something like this:
1. Devise outline plan:
i. Establish desired outcome (scale of death/
destruction/publicity);
ii. Establish likely target locations.
2. Perform reconnaissance without being detected:
i. of suitable area(s) for leaving a vehicle-borne
device (including parking restrictions, parking
enforcement, normal parking activity, physical
security, closed-circuit television and any blast
enhancing factors).
ii. of transport route(s) into suitable area.
iii. of escape route(s) from suitable area.
3. Decide upon the most appropriate modus operandi
(probably only two main options):
i. Time delay device (long or short);
ii. Command initiation (remote or co-terminus
(co-terminus = suicide)).
4. Gather detailed information to support modus
operandi:
i. from personal contact;
ii. from printed materials (books, newspapers, etc.);
iii. from the Internet;
iv. from first principles.
5. Locate suitable base from which to launch attack:
i. one’s own property;
ii. a friend’s property;
iii. a rented property;
iv. a derelict/ownerless property.




7. Obtain suitable explosive materials/precursors
without being hurt or detected (probably three main
options):




iii. homemade from purchased or stolen precursors.
8. Obtain information about how to assemble a device:
i. Purchase or steal necessary materials;
ii. Purchase or steal necessary tools;
iii. Assemble device.
9. Obtain vehicle and other tools for transport and
containment of explosive device without being
detected.
10. Transport vehicle to target without being spotted or
challenged or explosives being detonated by
accident.
11. Find suitable spot for the explosive(s) and (if
necessary) for nearby viewing point for detonation -
without being spotted or challenged.
12. Remove any physical obstacles at detonation site
without being spotted or challenged.
13. Arm device and leave vehicle without being spotted
or challenged.
14. Leave area or go to viewing point.
15. Detonate device if command initiated (e.g. radio or
telephone controlled) without being spotted or
getting injured from explosion.
Detailed narrative (2)
Step 10 above, “Transport vehicle to target without be-
ing spotted or challenged or explosives being detonated
by accident”, describes how ABB needed to transport the
vehicle with explosives safely to the target. The detailed
narrative about how ABB implemented this step is
sketched out below.
To make the transport possible ABB first needed to
obtain a vehicle. His compendium describes how he
rented a van from the AVIS Rental Company, picked it
up in Oslo on 15 July and removed the car’s insignia
when back at the farm (his safe house) (Berwick 2011:
2346). From 18 to 19 July ABB loaded the van, including
the device and anti-friction/shock stuffing. ABB had cre-
ated this stuffing by cutting up a mattress and placing it
in three layers in a cardboard box, and used this “to
transport the booster and detonators separately from the
main cargo” (Berwick 2011: 2348–2349).
On the evening of 20 July at approximately 10 pm, pic-
tures from the toll ring show that the van passed into
the Oslo city centre from the east (Helgesen 2011). ABB
then parked the van outside a garden centre at Skøyen,
an area in the Western part of Oslo (ABC nyheter 2012).
Next, it is known that the van crossed an entry ramp
into the city centre close to Skøyen at 3:04 pm on 22
July (Helgesen 2011; Blom 2011; Johansen et al. 2011).
ABB then parked near the entrance of the government
building and was observed running away at 3:17 pm(Sandvig et al. 2011; Andersen and Grøttum 2011; Vikås
et al. 2011; NOU 2012). At precisely 3:25 and 22 sec-
onds pm, the improvised explosive device was detonated
(The Public Prosecutors of Oslo 2012).
Script clashes (3)
Transport-related script clashes here include:
 Car rental company (AVIS) might provide insignia
that cannot be removed versus offender making the
rental car anonymous to minimize the probability of
being spotted or challenged.
 Surveillance by officials along the transport route
into the city centre versus offender transporting
vehicle to target without being spotted or challenged
 Surveillance by place managers and passersby
outside the government building versus offender
parking vehicle, detonating explosives and escaping
without being spotted or challenged.
Situational crime prevention measures (4)
What sort of measures could have impeded ABB in
transporting the vehicle to the target without being
spotted or challenged or explosives being detonated by
accident?
One possible (extreme) measure is physically fencing
off a larger area around the government building to stop
anyone from bringing vehicles to the target areas. Simple
fences would probably have impeded ABB, but barriers
that can withstand some force would also stop vehicles
using speed to force itself through the barriers. However,
this measure would also stop any legitimate vehicle from
entering the area, including emergency vehicles, delive-
ries and so on. This problem could be somewhat
amended by entry points for vehicles with permits to
enter, which would let emergency vehicles and vehicles
with other legitimate purposes in, although at a delay.
Such entry points would need to be equipped with both
instruments and personnel suitable for stopping explo-
sive attacks. If the entry points lack the capability to ac-
tually stop the attacker with equipment, the entry points
will only be a warning system. Another option is to close
off the area only at certain hours (for instance when the
area would be more crowded). However, this time-
limited ban would require security personnel to check
the area for vehicles and perhaps fine anyone who has
not removed their vehicle before the ban goes into ef-
fect. These adjustments could be combined, but they
would both incur increased costs, as well as heightening
the risk of any offender being able to smuggle explosives
into the area.
A less extreme measure would be to make it impos-
sible to park close to the government building. In fact,
some bollards had been installed outside the building,
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the government building.
Explosive detectors could also be installed, either at
the entry points to a closed off area or at an outer per-
imeter such as the toll ring. An explosives detector is “a
device capable of detecting the presence of certain types
of explosives”(Garcia 2008, p. 331). Nevertheless, the
cost and speed of the current technology makes this op-
tion less viable. The follow-up of any alarm could also
make the measure too people-intensive and thus too ex-
pensive (Meyer and Ekblom 2011).
A measure that could limit the size of an explosion is
to limit the size of the vehicles allowed access into an
area with access control. This measure would make it
more difficult to transport larger explosives into the
area, but would also demand enforcement (probably ac-
cess control). This measure would probably be most ef-
fective when combined with the measure of closing off a
larger area, while including entry points for vehicles with
permission to enter.
A last measure is to make the roads into the area
bumpy, and thus make it more risky to drive across
without detonating the explosives by accident. However,
such bumps would also make driving much less com-
fortable for all drivers, and might also harm other types
of deliveries.
Rational planning (5)
How would ABB have reacted if he had been denied ac-
cess for his vehicles? If physical obstacles had blocked
ABB from transporting a vehicle into the area, he would
have had five main choices of action: (1) abandon the
attack entirely, (2) leave the vehicle at the perimeter as
close as possible to the government building, (3) attack
another target, (4) leave a (smaller) person-borne explo-
sive inside the area, or (5) choose another attack mode.
The best outcome (for the authorities) would be him
abandoning the attack entirely. Leaving the vehicle at
the perimeter could also be beneficial if it had caused
fewer deaths and/or less material damage. The damage
inflicted if the perimeter is attacked should therefore be
considered before deciding its location. To move the
perpetrator toward another target would only be benefi-
cial as long as an attack on such a target would cause
less harm than an attack on the government building. If
more people would be killed (e.g. because more people
find themselves at the new target or the building has a
higher risk of collapsing), the embargo on vehicles
around the government building could actually be detri-
mental. The authorities should therefore consider pos-
sible target substitutions and their consequences for the
expected harm before introducing such a ban on vehi-
cles. Finally, ABB might have chosen a completely differ-
ent mode of attack such as a shooting massacre, whichwould probably have been better because such a mas-
sacre most likely would have made it impossible for ABB
to go on to commit the other shooting massacre at
Utøya. Prospective victims would also have more escape
opportunities (more opportunities to run and hide) than
at Utøya, and the authorities would probably have been
able to confront him sooner. ABB could also have
employed unconventional weapons that might have
inflicted more harm, although unconventional weapons
are either difficult to obtain, create or spread without be-
ing detected.
If the authorities allowed for some vehicle access into
the closed off area, ABB could have faked permission to
enter (pretending to be either an emergency vehicle or
deliveries). One way of making it more difficult to
choose such a deception for lone wolves is to demand
that all vehicles entering the area need to have at least
two occupants.
If all the space close to the government building had
been fenced off, ABB could only have left the car in the
street. The bomb would therefore have been further
from the government building, while being closer to the
building across the street. Passersby might also have
reacted sooner, including those driving other vehicles.
However, would ABB being forced to leave the car in the
street made have any difference anyway? The security
guards supposedly initiated investigative efforts when
the car was parked outside the government building,
and CCTV pictures recorded ABB walking from the car
in a fake police uniform, helmet, face shield and pistol
(Andersen and Grøttum 2011). Since no one succeeded
in impeding the attack when both the car and ABB sup-
posedly seemed suspicious, ABB being forced to park
the car in the street would probably not have stopped
the attack. A few people could have escaped, but other
people might just as easily have gathered around instead.
The only effect of removing parking spaces would thus
have been some redistribution of the damage between
buildings.
Explosive detectors at entry points or an outer perim-
eter might be avoided by either choosing explosives that
the detectors would not detect or “hiding” them. An-
other way to avoid detectors is to make the explosives
inside the perimeter. In the compendium, however,
Breivik devotes a lot of space to the problem of avoiding
detection, and he worries quite a bit about someone no-
ticing anything strange whenever anyone drops by his
rented farm (Berwick 2011). Making explosives without
being detected in a highly populated area could therefore
be difficult. ABB could probably have easily dealt with
the bumpy roads by making more anti-friction stuffing.
In summary, the most effective measure aimed at im-
peding ABB in transporting the vehicle to the target
without being spotted or challenged, or explosives being
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This measure could be combined with entry points for
vehicles with permission to enter. Additionally, these
entry points should be manned with qualified security
personnel and, if viable technology exists, explosive de-
tectors could be added. A size limit on vehicles could
make screening easier and limit the consequences of a
failure of the explosive detection.
Comparable attacks (6)
Would denying vehicle access have impeded comparable
attacks?
The Oklahoma bombing On 19 April 1995, Timothy
McVeigh parked a large Ryder truck with explosives out-
side the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown
Oklahoma City. The vehicle bomb destroyed half of the
nine-story building, killing 168 and injuring several
hundred people (Hartzler 1997; BBC news 1998). Would
a physical barrier have stopped this attack? The Alfred
P. Murrah Federal Building was located in the middle of
the city centre and earlier plots have demonstrated the
building’s attractiveness as a right-wing target (Thomas
and Smothers 1995). The Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building would hence have probably been included in
any fenced off area.
How would Timothy McVeigh have adapted if he
lacked vehicle access to his preferred target? He chose
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building because he was
convinced it contained the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, and he considered it as an “easy target”.
Nonetheless, he seems to have had general anti-government
sentiments, and he may have therefore perceived all
federal buildings to be legitimate targets (Hartzler 1997).
A Google map search on federal buildings in Oklahoma
City shows five downtown- and four less centrally lo-
cated federal buildings, and any closed off area would
perhaps have included the downtown buildings, while
excluding the four other buildings. However, satellite
pictures indicate that these four buildings might be
better protected and at least not as tall as the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building. Any attack on these less cen-
trally located buildings may therefore have caused less
harm than the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building at-
tack. Thus, fencing off an area would have been bene-
ficial in this attack.
The Doha players theatre bombing On 19 March
2005, an Egyptian named Omar Ahmed Abdullah Ali
crashed an SUV into the lobby of the Doha Players
Theatre in Doha, Qatar. Subsequently, he detonated a
bomb, killing himself, the British director and injuring
12 others (Lepeska 2010; BBC news 2005b). If the show
had not started earlier than the previous two days, more
people would have been in the café at the time of theattack and the number of killings could have been higher
(BBC News 2005a). The Doha Players Theatre was situ-
ated outside the city centre and would therefore not
have been inside any perimeter protecting the city
centre. However, the theatre was a well-known haunt of
the expat community, and international schools in the
area had increased the security owing to warnings of a
heightened terrorism risk in Qatar (BBC News 2005a,
2005b). Hence, the theatre could have installed a small
standoff outside of its building, and the effect of the at-
tack would probably have been much smaller.
A lack of information on the motivation behind the
attack makes it difficult to establish how Omar Ahmed
Abdullah Ali would have reacted if faced with a standoff.
If he targeted Westerners (as recommended by al-Qaeda’s
Saudi boss, Saleh al-Oufi), a standoff could have increased
the relative risk of more crowded ex-pat targets in Doha,
such as international schools. An attack on another target
might therefore have caused more harm than the potential
harm from the Doha Players Theatre attack.
The polish copycat Brunon Kwiecien allegedly planned
to ram through security fences around the Polish parlia-
ment with a tanker truck loaded with an explosive device
and detonate this device within the courtyard. Kwiecien
considered ABB’s attack on the Norwegian government
building a failure; ABB parked his vehicle outside the
government building, putting a small distance between the
explosive device and the building. Kwiecien planned to
construct a larger explosive device and drive the truck
into the gates to ensure destruction of the building
(West 2012). Kwiecien was apparently convinced that for-
eigners ran Poland, and therefore the government and the
President needed to die. Moreover, he had already trav-
elled to Warsaw to carry out reconnaissance missions on
the parliament building (Day 2012).
The Polish parliament building already had a security
fence that Kwiecien was planning to ram. The security
fence must have either been too weak to withstand the
required force or Kwiecien underestimated its ability
to withstand the force. If Kwiecien had underestimated
the barrier’s strength, the device may have detonated
at the outer perimeter instead of in the courtyard. An
explosion further from the parliament building would
less likely have caused a structural collapse of the par-
liament building and might therefore have caused
fewer deaths. In fact Kwiecien was right about the se-
curity fence lacking in strength so the case illustrates
the need to construct barriers that can withstand sub-
stantial force.
Summary
The above sections show that the most effective way of
impeding ABB in transporting the explosives may have
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ing to stop vehicles from entering this area.
The shooting massacre
This section investigates what type of measures might
have impeded the transport of ABB with weapons in the
2011 Norway shooting massacre and what type of mea-
sures would have supported the transport of victims
from the shooting site. The first part presents the crime
script ABB had to undergo to complete a successful
shooting massacre. The second part outlines how ABB
transported himself and his equipment from the safe
house at Rena to Utøya, and points out some possible
script clashes between ABB and other relevant actors.
Third, which measures could have either stopped the
attack or reduced the harm inflicted, and how ABB
might have adapted to these measures, is discussed.
Finally, this section discusses whether these measures
also would have impeded other comparable attacks.
Crime script (1)
A crime script for an offender performing a shooting
massacre could go something like this:
(1) Devise an outline plan:
i. Identify likely target population;
ii. Identify likely gathering places and select the
most desirable.
(2) Establish preferred modus operandi:
i. Automatic weapons required?
ii. Long-range or close quarter attack (CQA)?
iii. Hostages?
iv. Options to limit movement of victims.
(3) Perform reconnaissance without being detected:
i. of suitable areas for opening fire;
ii. of transport routes into suitable area;
iii. of the likelihood of armed opposition (at the
location or as a quick response);
iv. of opportunities to acquire additional weapons
during attack (e.g. from surprise attack against
armed police);
v. of escape routes from a suitable area if planning
to escape;
vi. of opportunities for a deception plan (e.g. dress
like a police officer, workman, etc.).
(4) Establish secure location from which to launch
attack:
i. one’s own property;
ii. a friend’s property;
iii. a rented property;
iv. a derelict/ownerless property;
v. a vehicle (e.g. houseboat, camper van).
(5) Consider personal security:
i. counter-surveillance;ii. a cover story;
iii. physical protection.
(6) Obtain firearms and ammunition for the shooting
incident without being hurt or detected.
Either:
i. purchase firearms and ammunition legally, or
ii. purchase firearms and ammunition on the black
market, or
iii. steal firearms and ammunition.
(7) Obtain any other tools necessary for performing the
shooting massacre without being detected.
(8) Perform fire training without being detected.
i. Train using shooting simulator/game, and/or
ii. Train using shooting range, and/or
iii. Train using other (hidden) areas.
(9) Travel to selected target without being spotted or
challenged.
(10) Charge firearms without being challenged.
(11) Launch firearms without being challenged.
(12) Repeat charging and launching firearms until either
challenged or escape.
(13) Leave area if planning to escape.
Detailed narrative (2)
ABB with tools Step 9 above, “travel to selected target
without being spotted or challenged”, describes how
ABB needed to get to Utøya unhindered. Here the de-
tailed narrative about how ABB implemented this step is
sketched out.
As early as 6 April 2011 he leased a silver grey Fiat
Doblo van from AVIS. He removed all the AVIS insig-
nias so the car would pass as his own (Berwick 2011,
p. 2326).
On the evening of 21 July at approximately 11 pm, pic-
tures from the toll ring show the Fiat passing into the
Oslo city centre from the east (Helgesen 2011). As with
the van with explosives, ABB then parked the Fiat in
Sigurd Iversens vei in Skøyen (NOU 2012, p. 17). Next,
pictures show the Fiat crossing an entry ramp into the
city centre close to Skøyen at approximately 11 am on
22 July (Helgesen 2011). He drove to Hammersborg
Square, a short walk from the government building, and
parked the Fiat there. After leaving the van with explo-
sives outside the government building, he walked up to
the Fiat at Hammersborg square (Sandvig et al. 2011)
and started the drive towards Utøya. According to ABB’s
defence lawyer, ABB believed police roadblocks had
caused the queue and ended up driving several detours
to avoid these roadblocks (Johansen et al. 2011). Before
4:30 pm, he arrives at Utvika and parks his car at a park-
ing lot near a grove (Vikås et al. 2011; VG TV 2011).
Owing to the yearly summer camp of the organization
known as AUF (Workers’ Youth League), 564 persons
were on the island of Utøya (The Public Prosecutors of
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guards (participants from the summer camp) at the quay
to register all the people travelling back and forth to
Utøya. One of the guards approached ABB and asked
him about his errand. ABB informed him that he came
from PST (the Police Security Service) and was sup-
posed to do a routine security inspection at Utøya after
the bomb explosion in Oslo. ABB wore a fake police uni-
form and, upon request, displayed a fake service certifi-
cate. The young guard was puzzled that the alleged
police officer arrived in a civilian car, but supposed that
all available police cars were participating in the rescue
work in Oslo (NOU 2012, p. 25).
At 4:57 pm the captain of the MS Thorbjørn (the
ferry between Utvika and Utøya) was notified about a
police officer (ABB with both fake police uniform and
fake police ID) who wanted to be ferried across to
Utøya. At 5:04 pm the ferry left Utvika with ABB on-
board (Johansen et al. 2011; Helgesen 2011; Vikås et al.
2011; VG TV 2011), and at 5:17 pm he disembarked at
the Utøya pier (The Public Prosecutors of Oslo 2012;
NOU 2012).
Victims Steps 10–12 above, “charging and launching
firearms until either challenged or escape”, describes
what ABB needed to do to kill people when he finally ar-
rived at Utøya.
The police have estimated that ABB started shooting
at approximately 5:21 pm. He shot his two first victims,
Monica Bøsei and Trond Berntsen, on the lawn in front
of the main house (NOU 2012, p. 26), and on the way
up to the “café building” he shot and killed another vic-
tim, before continuing on his 75-minute-long shooting
spree around Utøya. He ended up killing 69 persons, of
whom 67 were hit by fatal gunshots. The two last per-
sons died as a result of injuries sustained in a fall, and/
or drowning while attempting to get away without
having been hit by gunshots (The Public Prosecutors of
Oslo 2012). At 6:25 pm, the police arrived at Utøya
(Fossan 2011) and arrested him at approximately 6:35 pm
(The Public Prosecutors of Oslo 2012).
Another prerequisite for ABB managing to commit so
many killings is the victims’ presence. When the youth
at Utøya became aware of the shooting, they attempted
to escape. At least 250 youths jumped into the sea and
started swimming away (Haug and Schjønberg 2011),
which was an effective escape strategy for the ones with
good enough swimming abilities. At 5:40 pm, ABB came
across some youths swimming away from Utøya and
started shooting at them, but did not hit anyone. Only
one person died from drowning when attempting to
escape by swimming, while another youth died from
falling off a cliff while fleeing (NOU 2012, p. 26). Many
youths were picked up by boats operated by volunteers,but others had to swim all 500 metres to the main-
land (Meland 2011; Gillesvik 2011). A few youths
even managed to escape by swimming after being shot
(Bentzrud 2011).
Some youths evacuated by boat, whereas nine used the
same ferry as ABB arrived on (Meland 2011; Tilseth
2011). ABB came across one group of youths that was
rowing away from Utøya and went after them and
started shooting. The boat was hit by several shots, but
none of the inhabitants were hurt (NOU 2012, p. 26-27).
Hence, whenever possible, evacuation by boat seems to
have been a good escape strategy.
The rest of the youths attempted to hide on the island,
including inside or outside houses (Martinovic 2011;
Stølan 2011; Mersland and Ankersen 2011), although
this escape strategy did not always succeed. For example,
at 5:31 pm ABB came across a group of youths hiding
along a path and shot and killed 10 of them while they
were lying close to each other. An 11th person was shot,
but survived (NOU 2012, p. 26). Later, at the pump
house, ABB surprised some youths who had been hiding
for some time, telling them he came from the police,
and after a short break he started shooting. The perpet-
rator shot and killed 14 people outside the pump house
(NOU 2012, p. 27). At approximately 6:30, ABB again
surprised some youths in hiding, killing five and hurting
five to six people (NOU 2012, p. 27).
Hiding outside therefore seems to have been a risky
escape strategy, while hiding behind a locked door was
safer, with a total of 47 people escaping safely after hid-
ing in the “Schoolhouse”. ABB approached the door and
shot two times through the windows in the door, but did
not attempt to enter (Johnsrud 2012).
Script clashes (3)
Transport-related script clashes here include:
 Surveillance by officials and other passengers on the
ferry versus the offender travelling to selected target
without being spotted or challenged.
 People present at Utøya avoiding being shot
(by either stopping or escaping the offender)
versus offender shooting a firearm without being
challenged.
 Rescuers assisting the people at Utøya in escaping
versus the offender repeatedly charging and
launching firearms until he was either challenged
or escaped.
Situational crime prevention measures and rational
planning (4 and 5)
ABB with tools What sort of measures could have
impeded ABB in travelling to a selected target without
being spotted or challenged? ABB posed as a policeman
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did not hide the fact that he was carrying firearms
(Øgår 2011). Passenger screening and/or metal detec-
tors would therefore not have helped in avoiding
this attack. If appropriate procedures for double-
checking the identity of public service personnel
had existed, the guards or other personnel might
have been able to refuse ABB ferry access to Utøya.
However, ABB could bypass the ferry by getting a
hold of his own boat and approaching the island in
such a vessel.Victims What type of measures could have removed the
victims and thus impeded ABB in charging and shooting
firearms?d Providing more opportunities for hiding be-
hind locked doors, such as in the schoolhouse, might
have saved more lives. Furthermore, the probability of
surviving the shooting was seemingly higher for people
who chose to escape by swimming away instead of hid-
ing in the open, and empowering people to evacuate the
island more quickly would also have reduced the num-
ber of killings. Studies show that providing information
with instructive evacuation messages during a fire can
help shorten the overall evacuation time (Fridolf et al.
2011). Consequently, a broadcasting system that could
warn the people at Utøya and encourage them to evacu-
ate would probably have led to more people being able
to evacuate the island. Speakers were actually already in-
stalled at Utøya and a system where designated people
were able to broadcast such a warning could have been
installed.
More vessels could also have increased the rate of
evacuation, both for people who (rightly or wrongly) be-
lieved that they lacked the necessary skills to evacuate
by swimming, and for people who just preferred to avoid
ABB by hiding rather than swimming. One survivor de-
scribes how he ended up hiding in a crack in a mountain
because the boat at the beach could not hold any more
passengers (Wilhelmsen 2011). Additionally, flotation
equipment could also have assisted people who lacked
the necessary swimming skills.
But could ABB have exploited the existence of storage
areas for evacuation equipment by shooting anyone ap-
proaching these areas? In the actual attack, ABB walked
around the island searching for victims despite the pres-
ence of a pier with several boats, and if ABB had chosen
to stay in one place, it would have been easier for people
to avoid him by hiding or just swimming from other
sides of the island. More than one storage area would
have solved that problem.
In summary, including a broadcasting system for
evacuation, as well as evacuation equipment, might have
reduced the number of killings at Utøya.Comparable attacks (6)
The cave of the patriarchs massacre On 25 February
1994 Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli settler and doctor,
entered the Ibrahim Mosque (the Isaac Hall) at the
Tombs of the Patriarchs during the morning prayers
(Church et al. 1994). Since he managed to avoid all se-
curity cameras when entering, possibly because of know-
ledge gained through his position as a reserve officer,
information is lacking about how he entered the mosque
(Helm 1994). He may have entered through the main
entrance, the door connecting the mosque and the
Abraham Hall or the door from the Yosefiya Hall
(Shamgar et al. 1994). He then opened fire on the crowd
of 400 to 500 worshipers (Church et al. 1994; Hedges
1994). According to the army, Goldstein fired approxi-
mately 110 bullets in 90 seconds with his assault rifle
(Hedges 1994; Haberman 1994). Goldstein killed 29 wor-
shipers and injured 125 before the survivors managed to
overpower and kill him (Issacharoff and Levinson 2010).
Shocked worshipers, some wounded and others carrying
dead bodies, poured out from the mosque into the pas-
sageway beyond the main entrance door. In the confu-
sion, some soldiers in the passageway started firing, and
conflicting reports on whether these shots killed anyone
still exist (Hedges 1994; Haberman 1994).
Even if information about how Goldstein entered the
mosque is lacking, several of the soldiers guarding the
tombs have admitted to having seen him walking around
with an automatic rifle at the site earlier in the morning.
Nobody interfered since Jewish settlers were allowed to
bring firearms when praying (in the Abraham Hall), and
the soldiers apparently found no reason to check the bag
where his ammunition magazines might have been
(Haberman 1994). A ban on weapons at the tombs and
better entry control could thus have made it much more
difficult to commit the attack.
How could Goldstein have adapted if faced with such
measures? He could have chosen another site inside the
tombs for the shooting, and he would then probably
have increased the risk of either being shot by soldiers at
the site during the shooting and/or hurting other Jews
frequenting the Tomb. He could also have chosen an-
other site outside the Tomb, but no other site in Hebron
has the same symbolic value for both the Muslims and
the Jews; the Tombs of the Patriarchs is actually the sec-
ond holiest place among all Jewish holy sites. He might
therefore have abandoned the attack entirely if he did
not expect to be able to commit a shooting massacre in
the Abraham Hall.
Better evacuation opportunities could have also helped
to remove some of the victims. However, since the
Tombs of the Patriarchs are a holy shrine and a listed
historical area, evacuation routes are difficult to add. As
a result, better evacuation opportunities might not have
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the incident. However, teaching soldiers how to better
deal with a panicking crowd would probably have been
effective, and lives might have been saved if none of the
soldiers had started shooting at the crowd.
The fort hood shooting On 5 November 2009 Nidal
Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army Major, entered the Soldier
Readiness Processing Center (a medical processing
centre for soldiers returning from- or about to be sent
overseas) at Fort Hood armed with two non-military
issue pistols, including a semi-automatic. At 1 pm,
Hasan was seen sitting among other soldiers getting
medical examinations, and then at 1:30 pm, Hasan
jumped up on a desk, shouted “Allahu Akbar” (“God is
Great”) and started shooting at the soldiers, stopping only
to reload his weapon. Over a 10-minute-period, he killed
12 soldiers and one civilian and injured approximately 30
others (NYTimes.com 2011; BBC News 2009b; Gruen
2010; Ninan and Press 2009; Krauss 2010; BBC News
2009a). After a few minutes Hasan went outside and con-
tinued on his shooting spree. Two civilian police officers,
Sergeants Mark Todd and Kimberly Munley, responded to
the scene and Sergeant Mark Todd succeeded in shooting
and disabling Hasan (Gruen 2010).
Hasan worked as a psychiatrist at the Darnell Medical
Center at Fort Hood (Sherwell and Allen 2009), so he
could therefore easily pretend to have legitimate reasons
for entering the centre. Entry control without weapon
screening would therefore have limited use in preventing
this shooting massacre. However, if he had been searched
for weapons, the non-military pistols would have been dis-
covered and the legitimacy of him bringing these weapons
to the centre could have been questioned.
How could Hasan have adapted if faced with such
measures? As mentioned above, soldiers about to be sent
overseas need to visit the Soldier Readiness Processing
Center. Hasan, who has expressed violent Islamic ex-
tremist views, could thus have regarded this site as being
particularly symbolically significant. Still, Fort Hood
consists of many sites with numerous soldiers expecting
to go overseas sometime; for this reason, Hasan could
probably have found alternative sites suitable for a
shooting massacre, while introducing entry control with
a weapon search at all these sites would probably be very
expensive.
The Soldier Readiness Processing Center was situated
in a low, brick building with only two exits, the main en-
trance and a back door (Shaughnessy 2009). Pictures of
the building also indicate a lack of windows to evacuate
by (Tolbert 2009), though if more evacuation opportun-
ities had existed, more people might have escaped and
more lives could have been saved. In the middle of the
shooting Hasan exited the building, searching for morevictims, while a serviceman stationed at Fort Hood has
said that he heard the emergency announcement over
the speakers outside and saw people rushing indoors
(BBC News 2009a). As a result, emergency routines at
the base probably saved lives that afternoon.
Summary
The section above demonstrates that stricter entry con-
trol may have impeded all of the above-mentioned at-
tacks. Measures facilitating evacuation could have (and
actually did) help in two out of three attacks, the ABB
and Fort Hood attacks. Very brief shooting massacres,
such as the Goldstein attack, might not last long enough
to enable any meaningful evacuation, and measures fa-
cilitating evacuation are therefore not as effective in
these cases.
Discussion
This study’s aim was to determine what type of
transport-related measures might impede lone-wolf
attackers, either by stopping an attack entirely or just re-
ducing the harm inflicted. This paper has combined
crime scripts, situational crime prevention and rational
planning to investigate what sort of measures might have
impeded the transport in the 2011 Norway attacks, in
addition to discussing whether these measures also
would have impeded other comparable attacks.
This study has shown that denying vehicle entrance to
an area can be very effective in impeding vehicle-borne
explosive attacks. To give access to vehicles with key
functions, such as emergency vehicles and deliveries, the
authorities could add entry points for vehicles with spe-
cial permissions, thereby easing the ban in less crowded
hours. The authorities could also demand that all vehi-
cles entering should have at least two occupants to make
it more difficult for lone attackers to sneak a vehicle
bomb into the area by obtaining false permission. If the
technology is/becomes viable, the authorities could
install explosive detectors at the entry points.
Nevertheless, the authorities should consider where to
put the perimeter and, in particular, any entry point
owing to a heightened risk at the barrier. The authorities
should also bear in mind that stopping vehicle access to
the terrorists’ most preferred targets may cause the ter-
rorists to attack other targets that are more accessible. If
an attack on these more accessible targets would cause
more harm (more killings etc.), closing off access to the
most attractive targets could actually increase the ex-
pected harm of explosive attacks.
Entry control focusing on checking identity, the visit’s
purpose and searching for firearms could have impeded
all of the above (lone-wolf ) attackers when launching
shooting massacres, although the type of entry control
needed varies. In the ABB and Goldstein, attacks the
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arms when entering. In both the ABB attack and the
Fort Hood attack, the offenders successfully pretended
to have legitimate reasons to be at the site. Goldstein,
however, had no legitimate reason to enter the Muslim
prayer hall.
Entry control is people-intensive and can thus be very
expensive. Hence, such measures should be applied only
at the targets that the terrorists find most attractive and/
or when it may be introduced at a small cost. Using
people already at the site, such as the people managing
the Utøya ferry, is a very cheap way of increasing entry
control.
Measures facilitating evacuation can also reduce the
harm of a prolonged attack. Such measures also reduce
the harm of other unwanted incidents, such as fires, but
can sometimes be difficult to install in existing buildings,
especially when the buildings have historical value.
This study suffers from some limitations. First, the
analysis uses a few lone-wolf attacks to derive some gen-
eral policy recommendations that could increase costs
and other inconveniences for ordinary people visiting
such targets. Given that the probability of an attack to-
wards any specific target at a specific time is very small,
one may question whether such security benefits actually
outweigh the costs. This dilemma is a key tension in
counter-terrorism, and the leap from scientific findings
to policy is therefore immense. Given our inability to
predict low probability events, a policy maker cannot
make his or her decision based only on such scientific
findings; the policy maker must also consider what costs
society is actually willing to incur to reduce risk.
This study is also limited by the fact that it draws only
on secondary sources, although given the nature of re-
search in the field of counter terrorism this is for now
inevitable.Endnotes
aFrom Klungtveit (2011) (author’s translation).
bAn assassination is a targeted murder of a prominent
person or political figure by a surprise attack.
cSee http://www.regjeringen.no/smk/html/22julikom-
misjonen/22JULIKOMMISJONEN_NO/EN.HTM
dMore armed guards at Utøya and a faster response
from the authorities might, of course, also have impeded
ABB in shooting, but this is outside this paper’s scope.
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